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Media and Power
For over 30 years, television has been the dominant media technology in Ukraine. Author N.V. Kostenko describes it as “not only as the leading conduit of information, but also as the instrument that organizes modern life.” According to an article published by Kostenko in 2011, about 94% of the adult population of Ukraine watches television. In fact, 45% of regular viewers watch television for at least 2 hours each day (3).
This fact did not go unnoticed by the oligarchs, who, thanks to the continuing privatization of media in Ukraine, have been able to accumulate more and 
more dominance over television Author Natalya Ryabinska uses the term “external ownership” to describe the nature of oligarchic control over media in Ukraine. The term refers to those industrial and financial magnates whose main interests and money-making ventures lie outside of the media sector. Because of conflicting loyalties, external owners allow their political and economic interests to determine media content (1).
Viktor Pinchuk, for example, is the founder and main owner of one of Ukraine’s leading steel industry groups. As of 2011, he owned three of the six top-rated terrestrial TV stations in Ukraine. Other “external” owners include Rinat Akhmetov, a coal and steel magnate and the country’s richest man, and Igor Kolomoysky, who is affiliated with the banking sector. Both men own one of the three top-rated TV stations in the country.
Both politicians and business leaders recognize the power of television to shape the opinion of viewers in Ukraine. In fact, it takes the largest share (>45%) of advertising money in the country (1). Broadcast owners use the dominance of television to deliver political messages and curry favor from leaders in the government. The fact that oligarchs gear their media coverage towards garnering political favor means that top politicians in the government determine media coverage as well, at least indirectly. Starting in 2006-7, the phenomena of hidden advertising, called jeansa, became popular in newspapers and TV. Programming and coverage was tailored to what politicians wanted (1).
Politicians also have a direct effect on the type of media provided to the Ukrainian public. The government is able to censor media coverage by selectively enforcing laws and using a variety of government-appointed regulatory bodies, such as the National Expert Commission for Public Moral Protection, founded by Kuchma in 2004.
There is, however, movement towards change in what may seem to be a bleak media picture. The internet is playing a progressively larger role in the country’s media environment as more and more Ukrainians use it for news and social connection.
Marina, a 28-year old woman who lives in Ukraine, says that she doesn’t even own a television set because TV programs “impose stereotypes and standard thoughts to people, and they don’t have their own mind.” Instead, she uses the internet as her primary medium, mostly visiting the sites Wikipedia, Facebook, and Google, all three of which are in the top 10 of Ukraine’s most popular sites (13).
Marina’s choice of the internet as a primary medium for information was echoed by Lena and Julia, two other young women living in Ukraine. They represent a shift that is beginning to take hold in the country. According to the World Telecommunication Database, over 30% of Ukrainian citizens were using the internet in 2011. This is a large increase from the 6.5% that were using the medium in 2007. The most significant growth is in urban areas. The European Journalism Centre states that over 75% of Ukrainian internet users come from the large cities. It is reasonable to expect that the internet will continue to develop as a major technology, and if Ukraine follows Western and European trends, it will eventually become the dominant one.